



# Extending COCOMO II to Estimate the Cost of Developing Secure Software

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Ground System Architectures Workshops

**GSAW2003**

March 4 - 6, 2003

# Outline

- **Why Extend COCOMO II for Security?**
- The COCOMO II Family of Models
- New Security Cost Driver and its Factors
- COCOMO II Cost Driver Values
- Next Steps and Summary

# Why Extend COCOMO II for Security



# Why Extend COCOMO II for Security

- ❑ Military projects have considered security in developing software since the early 1980s
- ❑ Until recently commercial projects often gave it little weight
- ❑ Threat to business-critical systems & private information has grown
  - Security can no longer be ignored
- ❑ Few cost models (including COCOMO II) include security factors
  - Based 1980s military perspective (Orange Book)
  - Developing secure systems has changed dramatically

# Adding Security to Cost Models

- Several approaches for addressing security
  - Modernize existing models
    - Primarily by updating definitions of cost drivers
  - Add new cost drivers to cost models
  - Develop separate security model


# Adding Security to Cost Models

- USC has taken intermediate approach
  - Add factor that addresses security from 3 viewpoints
    - Development
    - Operational
    - Physical
  - Include factors as appropriate to all COCOMO II family cost models
  - Address both commercial & military projects regardless of
    - Size
    - Domain
    - Level of maturity

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# COCOMO II Refresher



## Effort in Person Month

$$PM_{estimated} = A \times (Size)^{(SF)} \times \left\{ \prod_i EM_i \right\}$$

SF: Scale Factors (5) EM: Effort Multipliers(17)



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# COCOMO II Security Driver (SECU)

## □ Viewpoints

- Physical Security
- Operational Security
- Development for Security

## □ Security strategies embraced

- Ad hoc Defense (Low)
- Passive Defense (Nominal)
- Active Defense (High)
- Layered Defense (Very High)
- Defense in Depth (Extremely High)

# Security Factors

## ❑ Development for Security

- Effect of processes for development & validation when security a factor

## ❑ Operational Security

- Effect of security policies, processes, tools and facilities that:
  - Permit identification of security events
  - Define subsequent actions to identify key elements
  - Report pertinent information to appropriate individual, group, or process

## ❑ Development Constraints

- Constraints placed on development when protecting software facilities:
  - From outside perimeter to inside office space
  - Includes all of information system resources

# Development for Security

## Rating : Low & Nominal

### Low

- No security requirements
- No protection other than provided by execution environment

### Nominal

Requirements	<input type="checkbox"/> Informal security requirements formulated for system
Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Analysis of security functions using <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Informal functional &amp; interface specification</li> <li>- Descriptive high-level design</li> <li>- Demonstration of corresponding pairs</li> </ul>
Testing	<input type="checkbox"/> Developer tests implementation of requirements <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Black box testing</li> </ul>
Life-cycle controls	<input type="checkbox"/> Simple Configuration Management (CM) with version numbers



# Development for Security

## Rating : High

### Nominal +

Requirements	<input type="checkbox"/> Fully defined external interfaces <input type="checkbox"/> Informal security policy modeling
Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Security enforcing high-level design <input type="checkbox"/> Informal low-level design description
Testing	<input type="checkbox"/> Independent testing of all functional requirements <input type="checkbox"/> Inspection of COTS source code if available
Life-cycle controls	Detailed delivery & installation procedures <input type="checkbox"/> Identification of security measures for life-cycle



# Development for Security

## Rating: Extremely High

Very High +

Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Fully defined external interfaces</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Informal security policy modeling</li></ul>
Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Semi-formal high level explanation</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Structured implementation with reduction of complexity</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Secure container for COTS and Open-source</li></ul>
Testing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Analysis of coverage of tests</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Ordered functional testing with tests of low-level design</li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Covert channel analysis</li></ul>
Life-cycle controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><input type="checkbox"/> Compete automation of CM<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– with coverage for developer tools</li></ul></li><li><input type="checkbox"/> Standardized life-cycle model<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– with compliance to implementation standards</li></ul></li></ul>

# Operational Security

## Rating: Low & Nominal

### Low

- No organization-wide security policies
- Ad-hoc security practices
- Optional firewall & virus protection

### Nominal

Administration	<input type="checkbox"/> Basic Security policies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– inc. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Password and Virus Protection policy</li> <li>• Network access and system use policy</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Guidelines for administrators & users
Protection	<input type="checkbox"/> Reasonable practices for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Checksum Verification</li> <li>– Software firewall(s)</li> <li>– Operating system logging</li> </ul>
Authentication	<input type="checkbox"/> Simple password-based authentication schemes

# Operational Security

## Rating: Very High

High +

Administration	<input type="checkbox"/> Comprehensive Security policies – inc. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Business continuity plans</li> <li>• Disaster recovery plans</li> </ul> <input type="checkbox"/> Incident response teams handle security breaches
Protection	<input type="checkbox"/> A layered defense strategy is implemented to protect the system with reasonable practices for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Proxy servers</li> <li>– Layered system monitoring with Intrusion Detection Systems</li> </ul>
Authentication	<input type="checkbox"/> Digital certificates & signatures used for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Authentication</li> <li>– Message integrity</li> <li>– Non-repudiation</li> </ul>



# Development Constraints Rating Description

## Nominal

- None

## High

- All source materials are locked up when not in active use

## Very High

- High +
  - Audited security markings in code

## Extremely High


- Very High+
  - Multi-compartment developer communication constraints

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# Draft Baseline Security Effort Distribution

☐ With wide standard deviations



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# Next Steps

- ❑ Reach consensus on cost drivers
  - FAA Workshop on security-May 03
  - Delphi run & calibration of factors in works
- ❑ Initiate efforts to statistically validate accuracy of model
  - Survey available 160+ COCOMO project data
  - Perform initial calibration
- ❑ Create enhanced COCOMO data collection forms
  - gather security related efforts
- ❑ Compare actual project data to expert opinions
  - Calibrate the model by weighting
    - Actual data
    - Expert opinions using Bayesian statistical techniques

# Summary

- ❑ Proposed extensions to COCOMO for development of Secure Systems
  - Based on *Common Criteria*
  - 1 Driver: SECU
  - 3 Factors:
    - Development for Security
    - Operational Security
    - Physical Security
  - Affects on other COCOMO II Drivers
    - RELY, CPLX, DOCU, SITE, TOOL
  - Affects on Size
  - Affects on project risk
  
- ❑ Hopefully stimulated your interest and motivated you to participate by sharing project data